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Chapter 4
Research Methods in 
Cognition and Emotion 
W. Gerrod Parrott 
Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA 
and 
Paula Hertel 
Trinity University, San Antonio, TX, USA 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we critically survey research methods used in the field of cognition 
and emotion. Research on cognition and emotion addresses a great variety of 
topics, which include the ways in which emotional states influence cognitive 
processes, the role of cognition in producing emotion, and folk categories and 
knowledge of emotion. So great is this variety that a brief chapter cannot address 
all the research methods that have contributed to the expansion of knowledge 
that has occurred in recent years; there are too many methods, and many are 
relevant only to particular specialized topics. Specialized research methods are 
discussed throughout this volume in the chapters devoted to the relevant topics. 
In this chapter we restrict our attention to methodological issues that span the 
field of cognition and emotion, yet are in some way unique to it. Not surprisingly, 
these are the issues and methods that have to do with emotion itself. 
What is common to most research on cognition and emotion is the inclusion of 
emotional states as an element of the research design. Emotions are sometimes 
treated as independent (or quasi-independent) variables, as categories or dimen­
sions that may be associated with changes in other variables. At other times, 
emotions are treated as dependent variables, as states whose quality or intensity 
may be influenced by other variables. There is a noteworthy parallel between 
research designs in which emotional state is an independent variable and those in 
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which emotional state is a dependent variable. Research on emotions' effects on 
cognition uses mood or emotion as an independent variable, and an important 
methodological issue for such research is how to produce different emotional 
states that then can be compared in their effects. A typical solution is to employ 
a "mood induction"-showing a film or playing music, for example-so that 
participants can be randomly assigned to one of the emotional states of interest. 
In such research, the techniques of inducing emotional states are prerequisite to 
studying the effects of the emotional states. Compare this research design to one 
that investigates the circumstances that give rise to moods or emotions: here, the 
independent variable will be a manipulation of factors hypothesized to influence 
the quality or intensity of emotional states, and the dependent variable will be the 
emotional state itself. In such research the independent variable will be analo­
gous to what in the previous design was the mood induction, and the dependent 
variable will be analogous to what in the previous design was the independent 
variable. When the quality and intensity of moods and emotion are measured, 
they have the status of "manipulation checks" if emotional states are an inde­
pendent variable and of "dependent variables" if emotional states are a depend­
ent variable. 
Because of these parallels we organize this chapter into three sections: the first 
on the ways that emotional states are incorporated into research, whether as 
independent, quasi-independent, or dependent variables; the second on the man­
ner in which emotion is measured, whether as manipulation check or as depend­
ent variable; and the third on general issues regarding the design of research on 
cognition and emotion. 
WAYS THAT EMOTIONAL ST A TES ARE 
INCORPORATED INTO RESEARCH 
When emotional states define one of the independent variables, the research 
methods associated with them play a foundational role in the research, for they 
define (and sometimes literally produce) the phenomena to be studied. The
selection of method is therefore crucial and yet often complex, for all methods 
carry disadvantages as well as advantages, and successful research often requires 
matching these to the research question as well as demonstrating convergence of 
several methods. When emotional states serve as one of the dependent variables, 
the focus of the research is usually on the causes or concomitants of the emotion, 
and the manner in which emotion is assessed can powerfully affect the types of 
conclusions that can be drawn. 
There are four basic approaches to incorporating emotional states into 
research. First, the states may be induced by circumstances imposed by the 
researcher. Alternatively, naturally occurring circumstances (outside the
researcher's control) may be taken advantage of for purposes of creating tempo­
rary emotional reactions. Third, longer-lasting emotional tendencies, such as 
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emotional traits or affective disorders, may be employed as quasi-independent 
variables or as correlational variables to study cognition and emotion. Finally, 
one may consider a fourth approach to consist of methods that do not attempt to 
induce emotional states at all: participants may be asked only to imagine a certain 
emotional state, to read a vignette describing one, or to recall an occasion in 
which they experienced a certain emotional state. Each of these methods has its 
place in research on emotion and cognition, as well as its limitations, so each is 
discussed separately below. 
Manipulations that Induce Emotional States 
Induced Emotional States as an Independent Variable 
Because researchers want to be able to infer a causal relationship between 
emotional states and performance on cognitive tasks, they have developed a 
variety of experimental techniques for inducing emotional or neutral states in 
randomly assigned participants. The success of each technique is then assessed by 
one or more measures. Techniques have been developed for eliciting a variety of 
emotional states under randomized laboratory conditions. These include such 
emotions as anger, anxiety, pride, envy, guilt, and embarrassment; however, by 
far the most attention has been devoted to moods rather than to emotions, and 
most of that to elation and sadness. 
The earliest of the modern techniques is the Velten Mood Induction 
Procedure (Velten, 1968). Participants are randomly assigned to read a series 
of statements that gradually increase in the degree of affectivity or, in the 
neutral induction, describe mundane facts. A multitude of other techniques 
exists, including hypnosis (Bower, 1981; Friswell & McConkey, 1989), auto­
biographical recall (Goodwin & Williams, 1982), guided imagery (Miller 
et al., 1987), and experiences of success or failure (Isen et al., 1978); participants 
may be exposed to films (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Philippot, 1993), to photo­
graphs (Fox, 1996), to odors (Ehrlichman & Halpern, 1988), or to music (Clark, 
1983); there are mood inductions that use posed emotional facial expressions 
(Laird et al., 1991), symmetric facial contractions (Larsen, Kasimatis & Frey, 
1992), and unilateral facial contractions (Schiff, Esses & Lamon, 1992). Some 
researchers have developed hybrid inductions, including two or more techniques 
at once, which may produce greater intensity (Mayer, Allen & Beauregard, 
1995). 
Researchers face a variety of issues when selecting a mood induction. One 
concern is the duration of the resulting mood, because moods can be relatively 
brief under some conditions (Chartier & Ranieri, 1989). Another concern is the 
intensity of the resulting mood, which can affect the generalizability of the 
findings if it is either greater or lesser than the corresponding everyday phenom­
ena of interest (see e.g. Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). 
In selecting a method it is important to avoid producing confounds with the 
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dependent measures-one certainly should not induce mood using autobio­
graphical recall when studying the effect of mood on autobiographical recall, and 
more subtle confounds must be avoided as well. It is crucial to keep in mind that 
either the induction itself or the measure of its effectiveness may invite partici­
pants to perform cognitive tasks in particular ways. For example, Velten's state­
ments included some that suggest impaired cognitive processes, so Seibert & 
Ellis (1991) modified his technique by removing such statements and by introduc­
ing a new procedure of asking participants to free associate to each statement. 
The latter modification may have introduced a different source of demand, 
however, because the subsequent cognitive procedures in their research assessed 
mind wandering (Hertel, 1997). Other induction procedures can establish other 
forms of demand, depending on their cover stories. Musical procedures, for 
example, might establish changes in arousal that are subsequently perceived 
as alterations of emotional state only when participants are asked to make 
mood ratings. In this regard, the manipulation check becomes part of the mani­
pulation, and its use as a verification of mood misses the mark of independence. 
More generally, a mood manipulation can increase the likelihood that certain 
subsequent materials will be better attended to, or that certain thoughts and 
memories will come to mind, merely on the basis of within-session cueing, 
regardless of effects on mood. Such changes could be an intentional strategy 
adopted by participants trying to act as if they were sad or happy (Perrig & 
Perrig, 1988) or they could also be due to recruitment of mood-related material 
by a conceptual context that has been established. Whatever the mechanism, 
researchers need to be wary of such confounds between mood inductions and 
dependent variables. 
Two issues that figure importantly in such considerations are whether 
research participants are to be informed that mood alteration is the goal of the 
procedure, and whether participants are to be asked to try to alter their own 
moods. Some mood inductions quite explicitly inform the participants that the 
topic of the research involves the effects of emotional states and that an emo­
tional state will likely be induced; some inductions also explicitly request that the 
participants cooperate in this effort by trying to achieve and sustain the desired 
emotional state. Other mood inductions attempt to alter participants' emotional 
states more surreptitiously with success/failure, odor, background music, auto­
biographical recall, or narratives, and often disguise the induction with a cover 
story (such as the device of the "prior unrelated experiment"). Whether enlisting 
the participants' cooperation in altering mood makes the induction more effec­
tive seems to depend on the type of induction: it appears to help with autobio­
graphical recall (Lanterman & Otto, 1996) but to be unnecessary for music 
(Kenealy, 1988). 
Most important is the implication of these issues for demand characteristics 
and thus for interpretation of the results. There are many types of demand, 
and their consequences for internal and external validity depend on the control­
lability of the cognitive process being studied and on the relevance of self­
regulation and generalizability to the topic of the research. There is some 
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evidence that cover stories are generally effective and that participants' re­
sponses are probably not faked in any straightforward sense (Berkowitz & 
Troccoli, 1986), but more subtle demand characteristics remain a concern. For 
example, one particular form of demand characteristic has been termed the 
subject compliance hypothesis of mood-congruent memory (Blaney, 1986). 
According to this hypothesis, mood inductions that explicitly encourage subjects' 
efforts to sustain their induced moods may cause participants to direct their 
thinking in ways that produce mood-congruent biases; the observed effects would 
therefore be due to participants' efforts at maintaining their moods, rather than 
to the moods themselves. The hypothesis has credibility given that, in the absence 
of any mood induction, instructions to cooperate in establishing the target mood 
can have effects similar to those produced by music or the Velten technique 
(Slyker & McNally, 1991) and that participants who are told to act as if they are 
in a particular mood show mood congruent recall (Perrig & Perrig, 1988). In fact, 
when cooperation instructions were omitted from a musical mood induction, 
Parrott & Sabini (1990) found evidence of mood incongruence in autobiographi­
cal recall. In a different study, however, Parrott (1991) instructed participants to 
cease their mood maintenance, and their performance nevertheless demon­
strated a mood-congruent effect in autobiographical recall. It may be that the 
subject compliance hypothesis holds true while participants seek to maintain 
their moods, but that once the moods are well established they resist self-regula­
tion for a time without continued efforts at mood maintenance. Thus, when the 
procedures allow, mood maintenance or role playing might underlie effects 
from experimental inductions, whereas attempts at mood regulation more likely 
typify participants in naturally dysphoric states (Hertel & Rude, 1991; Parrott, 
1993). 
Because the effects of mood inductions can include cognitive and demand 
effects, it is advisable to include control conditions to test for their effects (or to 
employ an induction that has already been so tested). A good example is the 
series of experiments conducted by Snyder & White (1982), who introduced 
control conditions to differentiate the cognitive and demand effects of the Velten 
induction from its emotional effects. In addition to the standard Velten proce­
dure, they included conditions in which participants only anticipated an elated or 
depressed induction (Experiment 2) as well as conditions in which participants 
received an ineffective mood induction (Experiment 3), and they showed that 
only participants receiving the actual Velten mood induction showed cognitive 
bias. 
Given the difficulties in eliminating demand effects, it is generally safer to use 
one of the more surreptitious mood inductions. However, it should be noted that 
participants may glean the purpose of even these inductions. The simple presence 
of numerous emotion-related questions asked before and after the procedure 
may make the point of the procedure rather obvious. This problem can some­
times be solved by placing the manipulation check after the cognitive task 
(Parrott & Sabini, 1990), but this solution may not always work because the 
effects of inductions are not always evident after the distraction and delay of 
66 W.G. PARROTT AND P. H E RTEL 
the experimental task. It is good practice, whenever participants' awareness of 
the experimental hypotheses may be an issue, to question participants about 
this issue during a post-experimental debriefing session. 
In reaching some tentative conclusion about the utility of experimental 
inductions, we make the following suggestions. First, induction procedures 
should be chosen on the basis of their freedom from demand characteristics for 
the specific topic being researched. If the topic of research concerns how people 
normally react to emotional states, then surreptitious mood inductions are pre­
ferred; more obvious inductions may be acceptable if the implications of the 
research do not include people's reactions to and regulation of their emotional 
states. Second, it should be acknowledged that the effects of the induction 
might result from changes unrelated to mood per se; solutions to this problem 
include running control conditions to check for effects of demand or contextual 
priming, as well as looking for convergence of findings in multiple experiments 
that use a variety of inductions and tasks. Third, most research using mood 
inductions should evaluate the influence of demand characteristics by debriefing 
participants, asking for their beliefs and suspicions about the experimental 
hypotheses while also realizing that some sources of demand can occur outside of 
awareness. 
Induced Emotional States as a Dependent Variable 
Induced emotional states serve as a dependent variable when the purpose of 
research is to discover the causes of emotion or the emotional consequences of 
an independent variable. Just as random assignment of participants to mood 
inductions provides the best evidence of the effects of emotional states, so too 
does randomized manipulation of emotional precursors provide the best evi­
dence of emotions' causes. The power of this type of research stems from the use 
of actual emotional states to assess the effects of factors that are experimentally 
manipulated. Experimental manipulation of the degree and legitimacy of frustra­
tion, for example, has yielded insight into the causes of anger (Kulik & Brown, 
1979), and systematic variation of the outcome and self-relevance of bogus 
personality tests has yielded insight into the effects of upward social comparisons 
on envy (Salovey & Rodin, 1984). Research on the emotional consequences of 
artistic and scientific problem solving (Feist, 1994), or of rumination and distrac­
tion (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993) are further examples of this type of 
research design. 
This approach is subject to several limitations, however. Foremost are the 
ethics of subjecting participants to conditions producing intense emotions, or 
of deceiving them about the presence of such conditions. It is unethical to 
randomly assign participants to conditions eliciting profound emotional states 
such as grief or depression, and other research methods must be used to study 
these emotions. Pragmatic limitations also exist: some emotional elicitors are 
difficult to produce even when it is ethical to do so. One difficulty stems from 
the brevity of experiments, which makes it difficult to simulate the goals and 
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interpersonal relationships that typically influence emotions. One solution is to 
personalize the manipulation, tailoring it to the individual participant's self­
concepts and concerns so that long-term concerns may be addressed even within 
short-term experiments. Another difficulty stems from the subtlety of appraisals 
needing to be tested as compared with the relative clumsiness of experimental 
manipulations. Here the only solution rests with researchers' cleverness and skill, 
as exemplified in the research cited in the previous paragraph. The advantages of 
employing induced emotional states as the dependent variable make it ideal 
for research on antecedents of emotional states, including appraisals, but for 
other topics the difficulties we have described have led researchers to opt for 
other methods. 
Naturally Occurring Temporary Emotional Reactions 
A variety of techniques take advantage of emotions and temporary moods that 
occur naturally in the context of the participant's daily life; these states can serve 
either as quasi-independent variables or as dependent variables. One motivation 
for adopting such techniques is to avoid threats to internal validity caused by the 
experimental context serving as a framework for the participants' behavior. And 
even if one grants the internal validity of a laboratory method, a researcher 
nevertheless may wish to adopt more naturalistic methods to ensure the ecologi­
cal validity and generalizability of the findings. Furthermore, some effects are not 
captured well in the laboratory: long emotional episodes, long-lasting effects, and 
emotion's consequences for ongoing social relationships are generally not avail­
able in laboratory research. Some aspects of emotional states simply must be 
studied naturalistically: The epidemiology of emotions, the rates of occurrence of 
emotions, or the actual features of emotion that appear in everyday life are all 
examples. 
The principal drawback of this approach is that it cannot ensure that par­
ticipants are randomly assigned to conditions. Research designs using naturally 
occurring states are quasi-experimental or correlational. If issues of causality 
are to be addressed, it is therefore necessary to try to test plausible alterna­
tive explanations of the findings by examining the data (Cook & Campbell, 
1979). The extra difficulty of establishing causality is often worth the trouble, 
because research on cognition and emotion in field settings permits use of 
situations that have strong personal significance and are enmeshed in the context 
of real life. 
Because of the decrease in experimental control, the distinction between 
emotional states as independent and dependent variable is less sharp; still, one 
can contrast research that emphasizes the consequences of emotional states with 
research that emphasizes the precursors of emotional states. Examples of the 
former would be research in which participants are approached as they leave a 
movie theater, still in an emotional state, and asked to make social judgments 
(Forgas & Moylan, 1987); or research on flashbulb memory, in which emotional 
reactions to a public event are considered as possible factors in later memory 
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reports (Conway et al., 1994). An example of research focusing on the precursors 
of emotional states might be research on the effect of expectations and attribu­
tions on emotion, in which participants are queried shortly after receiving 
an important grade in a course (Van Overwalle, Mervielde & De Schuyter, 
1995). 
Another advantage of naturalistic methods is that they enable researchers to 
take advantage of exceptional circumstances to test emotions that are more 
profound than can be produced in the laboratory and are unusual even in every­
day life. For example, the withdrawal of a political candidate from an election 
allowed a test of laboratory findings about appraisal (Levine, 1996), and the 
occurrence of an earthquake after the administration of a questionnaire to a large 
sample permitted a test of the effects of certain cognitive styles on depression and 
distress (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
A number of research methods have been developed specifically for working 
with naturally produced emotional states. Some researchers supply participants 
with questionnaires or structured diaries in which data can be recorded as soon as 
possible after emotional states occur in everyday life (Oatley & Duncan, 1994; 
Planalp, DeFrancisco & Rutherford, 1996; Rime et al., 1991). Other researchers, 
interested in sampling time rather than sampling emotions, have supplied partici­
pants with alarm-equipped wrist watches or radio-activated beepers to signal the 
time for data gathering. 
Emotional Traits and Affective Disorders 
Some research on cognition and emotion investigates longer-lasting emotional 
tendencies, such as emotional traits or affective disorders, rather than (or in 
addition to) momentary emotional states. These longer-lasting dispositions enter 
research designs in several ways. Sometimes researchers are interested in these 
stable emotional dispositions themselves, comparing the performance on a cogni­
tive task of participants who score high and low on some individual difference 
measure such as trait anxiety (Dalgleish, 1995). At other times researchers are 
interested in distinguishing the effects of these stable emotional dispositions from 
those of temporary emotional states, using an individual difference measure of 
the former in combination with a mood induction of the latter (Byrne & Eysenck, 
1995; Fox, 1996). 
Because traits or disorders are pre-existing at the time of research in all but 
longitudinal research, studies most often focus on the concomitants or conse­
quences of these longer-lasting tendencies. Yet there is nothing in principle to 
prevent researchers from investigating the precursors of traits or disorders; 
researchers simply must adopt the same quasi-experimental and correlational 
methods that are necessary for studying naturally occurring temporary emotional 
states, with similar difficulties in establishing causality. But, whereas non­
experimental approaches are optional for research on temporary emotional 
states, they are virtually the only option for research on affective disorders and 
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emotional traits. There is now a large literature on the precursors of emotional 
disorders, which employs correlational, quasi-experimental and longitudinal re­
search methods (see the chapters in this volume on affective disorders). It is less 
common to see research on the precursors of emotional traits, but similar meth­
ods may be used. A good example would be recent research investigating how 
adult emotional traits are related to early attachment experiences and parental 
rearing styles (Magai, Distel & Liker, 1995). 
The use of clinically derived categories of affective disorders (e.g. generalized 
anxiety disorders, phobias, major depression or dysthymia) and categories 
based on self-report measures of enduring mood states and traits (e.g. test 
anxiety or depressed states) introduces a host of methodological issues, but we 
must limit our discussion to only two: generalizability and specificity. Other 
relevant issues, including the validity of diagnostic instruments and methods for 
establishing the etiology of affective disorders, are beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
Generalizing from self-reports on inventories such as the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961) to emotionally disordered samples cannot be 
justified. In this regard, the literature contains several useful sets of guidelines for 
research with student samples (e.g. Deardorff & Funabiki, 1985; Kendall et al., 
1987). In particular, Kendall et al. recommended multiple method assessment, 
including a clinical interview if the researcher intends to use the term 
"depressed" as a nosologic category. Without multiple measures, the use of cut­
off scores, such as 10 or greater on the BDI, should be accompanied by references 
to "dysphoria", a term that denotes non-specific negative affectivity. Yet, in spite 
of these and other guidelines for the use of the BDI, published reports of 
experiments on "depression" and cognition often still include one-session, one­
method assessments and refer to their participants as "depressed" if their scores 
exceed a low cut-off (see Haaga & Solomon, 1993). 
Even less well-justified is the tendency to generalize from induced moods to 
natural long-term states and dispositions, yet many researchers use terms like 
"depressed" to refer to the participants who have undergone an induction proce­
dure (e.g. Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Snyder & White, 1982). Such usage seems 
imprecise without systematic comparisons of experimental inductions and natu­
rally occurring states (see Gotlib, Roberts & Gilboa, 1996). Consider that in one 
of few such comparisons, Hertel & Rude (1991) found a lack of correspondence 
in free recall between experimentally induced participants and dysphoric partici­
pants; the different patterns were interpreted in terms of differing motivation and 
demand in the two samples. 
A second issue concerns the specificity of the findings to particular disorders, 
compared to their applicability to psychological distress more generally. 
For example, it has long been acknowledged that scores on the BDI are moder­
ately correlated with scores on anxiety inventories and other measures of 
negative states (Clark & Watson, 1991; Gotlib, 1984); both college students 
and patient samples show such correlations (Vrendenburg, Flett & Krames, 
1993). Indeed, anxiety may characterize depressed states (Alloy et al., 1990). 
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Therefore, the issue of specificity-to "depressed" mood apart from anxious 
mood-extends to studies with participants diagnosed with depressive disorders 
(e.g. major depression or dysthymia) via a structured clinical interview. Consider, 
for example, that memory impairments are not unique to depressed samples but 
characterize other psychopathological syndromes (Burt, Zembar & Niederehe, 
1995). 
Although comorbidity is an ongoing concern in the clinical literature, building 
a literature on cognitive correlates of dysphoria or depression does not 
necessarily entail claims that the phenomena are unique to those states or syn­
dromes. Clearly, when the research hypothesis concerns the cognitive com­
ponents of a particular theory of depression (e.g. Beck's theory), we must 
contrast findings from a carefully diagnosed sample of depressed participants to 
those obtained from other diagnosed groups. However, if the research is guided 
by theories in cognitive psychology, it should be sufficient to show that perform­
ance differs according to the presence or absence of dysphoria or depression, 
and other studies might examine similar patterns in anxiety. When cognition­
emotion interactions take the same form across diagnostic groups or mood 
categories, this outcome is no less interesting to the researcher than if the pattern 
had been constrained to one category alone. As the field has matured in recent 
years, interest in the interaction of emotion and cognition is motivated not 
merely by the goal to distinguish among nosological categories (Ingram, 1984) 
but also by the goal to examine the adequacy of mainstream cognitive theories 
in accommodating individual differences in emotional states (Williams et al., 
1988). 
In summary, we recommend that researchers who examine the correlates of 
any classification scheme: (a) carefully describe the research as correlative and 
not indirectly imply causal status to the category; (b) distinguish between essen­
tially self-reported and diagnostic categories fully throughout their discourse; (c) 
resist the temptation to generalize from data on temporary mood state to more 
stable syndromes or disorders; and ( d) attend to whether their concerns are 
primarily diagnostic (leading to differentiation among disorders, traits and states) 
or descriptive of particular disorders, traits and states in ways that might also 
apply to others. 
Remembered and Hypothetical Emotional States 
In some research there is no attempt to incorporate ongoing emotional states at 
all. Instead, the research relies on participants' memories of past emotional 
states, or on their intuitions about the nature of emotional reactions to scenarios 
that are depicted via text or film. There are various reasons for adopting such 
methods. For some research, actual emotional states are beside the point; for 
example, research on conceptions of emotion and on emotion knowledge quite 
properly addresses participants' conceptions rather than their emotions. In other 
cases the choice of remembered or imagined emotions is one of necessity or 
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convenience rather than of preference. In research on appraisal, for example, 
most research has emphasized recollections or intuitions, not because real-time 
appraisals are not of interest but because these cognitive events are fleeting and 
subtle and thus difficult to capture with existing methods. Such research has been 
subject to various criticisms. Recollections may be more prone to schematic 
distortion than ongoing events, and imagined vignettes may lack the immediacy, 
personal importance, and gradual temporal development of real-life events 
(Levine, 1996; Parkinson & Manstead, 1993). 
One way to overcome some of these criticisms is to sample memories of 
emotions that are very recent, such as by scheduling frequent visits to the labora­
tory to report on recent emotional experiences (Sonnemans & Frijda, 1995). In 
fact, the distinction between naturally occurring emotional states and remem­
bered emotional states blurs as the interval between the end of the emotional 
state and collection of data shortens. The questionnaire and diary methods 
described in the section on naturally occurring emotions may well be more 
properly considered to be studies of remembered emotional states than of ongo­
ing naturally produced ones. 
Another way to blunt these criticisms is to ensure that participants recall or 
imagine the emotional state in such detail as to re-experience it prior to answer­
ing questions about it. This procedure may help to overcome the tendency 
toward schematic recall (Parrott & Smith, 1991). Interestingly, it may work by 
actually reinstating (or inducing) an emotional state to some extent. It should be 
recalled that autobiographical memory is sometimes used as a mood induction, 
and that there is evidence that asking participants to re-experience a remem­
bered emotional event makes the reinstated emotion more intense (Lantermann 
& Otto, 1996). Procedures employing remembered or hypothetical emotional 
states may, therefore, actually induce real emotional states, at least under some 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the limitations of memory and intuition cannot be 
eliminated completely and, ideally, other methods should be used to complement 
them. 
MEASURING EMOTIONAL STATES 
Research that incorporates emotional states into the design requires that the 
quality and intensity of the emotional state be assessed in some way. The issues 
surrounding the measurement of emotional states are often complex and techni­
cal; all but the most basic overview is beyond the scope of this chapter. We try to 
supply that overview below, and include references that will guide the interested 
reader to more complete discussions. Our presentation is organized according to 
the three aspects of emotion that are commonly measured: self-report, behavior 
and physiology. It is important to note that these aspects are not components of 
a coherent emotion construct and correlate only imperfectly. They are often 
conceptualized as being separate processing levels or response systems that are 
not closely linked (Lang, 1988; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). 
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Self-report 
If one begins with the belief that emotional states are conscious, the primary way 
to assess their presence is self-report. But not all researchers believe that emo­
tional states need be conscious, and even those that do usually also believe that 
there are interesting concomitants of these conscious states that occur outside of 
awareness (Ekman & Davidson, 1994). Thus, for most researchers, self-reports of 
emotional states tap an important aspect of emotion, but not the only one. Self­
report is recommended when a person's conscious experience of emotional states 
is what needs to be assessed. An obvious advantage of self-report is that it is 
simple and convenient to use. 
The assessment of conscious states can be problematic, however. There is 
little consensus about how conscious states arise; contemporary working 
hypotheses include direct causation by neural activity, perception-like inferences 
based on behavior or physiology, and perception of emotional meaning in 
objects and events (Parrott, 1995). All of these admit to a variety of distor­
tions and biases due to expectations, social norms, attributions, allocation of 
attention and the like, and researchers must be mindful of these influences. 
Certainly, when an actual emotional state is not present at the time of self­
report these influences would seem likely to be especially threatening (Parkinson 
& Manstead, 1993; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). One recent study found some 
cause for reassurance by demonstrating that, although self-reports of hedonic 
tone may be influenced by the social desirability of the state, such bias cannot 
adequately account for the pattern of responses (Barrett, 1996). One possible 
disadvantage of self-report is that participants in research may infer that 
their emotional states are of interest to the researcher, which may lead to 
self-consciousness that may alter behavior. If this possibility is deemed a prob­
lem, solutions include disguising the self-report items by embedding them 
in another questionnaire, delaying measurement of emotional state until other 
critical variables are assessed, or assessing emotion with a method other than 
self-report. 
For whatever reasons, self-report is overwhelmingly the most common 
method of measuring emotional states. The most common technique is 
the administration of a series of Likert or analog rating scales, although 
other formats may be used (e.g. Eich, 1995). These measures are often devised 
especially for each study, but it is also common to administer a published 
standardized inventory of ratings scales or a checklist. Among the most com­
monly used are the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clark & 
Tellegen, 1988), the Discrete Emotions Scale (Izard, 1972), the Multiple Affec­
tive Adjective Checklist-Revised (Zuckerman & Lublin, 1985), and the 
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983). Different 
methods of scoring such measures introduce different forms of bias, and these 
must be taken into account when planning research (Green, Goldman & Salovey, 
1993). 
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Behavioral and Cognitive Indices 
An alternative means of measuring emotional states is to detect behavioral and 
cognitive patterns that are associated with them. The most common behavior 
used in research on cognition and emotion is the psychomotor retardation asso­
ciated with sadness. Psychomotor retardation can be indexed via writing speed 
(Clark, 1983) or letter cancellation (Mayer & Bremer, 1985). Other emotional 
states are associated with discrete behaviors, such as gaze aversion and blushing 
in the case of embarrassment (Asendorpf, 1990), and these can be very useful in 
detecting elements of emotional states not accessible to consciousness, as well as 
in detecting emotional states without making participants aware of researchers' 
interest in these states. 
Facial expressions are one type of behavior often associated with emotional 
states. Research suggests that their occurrence is sensitive to the presence of 
actual or imagined social contexts, but when these are of interest or are control­
led for, facial expressions may have some use as evidence for the presence and 
intensity of certain emotions (Ekman, Friesen & Ancoli, 1980; Keltner & Ekman, 
1996). 
The cognitive aspects of emotion that are the topic of much of this volume are 
understood well enough to be used as measures of emotion. Although it has been 
rare to date, alterations in attention, memory or judgment could serve as an index 
of particular emotional states, just as psychomotor retardation has been. When 
such tasks have been used as indexes of mood they have proven as effective as 
behavioral tasks (Kuykendall, Keating & Wagaman, 1988; Mayer & Bremer, 
1985). 
Psychophysiological Indices 
Measurements of the physiological concomitants of emotional states may be 
used for all the reasons cited in favor of behavioral and cognitive indices. Re­
searchers have creatively employed such measures to avoid the drawbacks of 
self-report measures, as when Pecchinenda & Smith (1996) used measures of skin 
conductance activity to supplement possibly untrustworthy verbal reports of 
appraisal. 
A variety of psychophysiological measures are commonly employed. They 
include heart rate, blood pressure, skin conductance, finger temperature, respira­
tion and eye movement variability. Description of these methods is beyond the 
scope of this article, and readers are referred to such standard references as 
Cacioppo & Petty (1983) and Wagner & Manstead (1989). An interesting combi­
nation of psychophysiological and behavioral methods is employed when 
electromyographic (EMG) methods are used to detect activity of the muscles 
responsible for emotional facial expressions (Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986). EMG 
signals can be detected for movements too slight to be visible on the face, and the 
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combined activity of different facial muscles can discriminate among emotions 
(Sinha & Parsons, 1996). 
More generally, as cognitive psychology moves in a neuroscience direction, 
interactions of cognition and emotion are increasingly assessed with neuro­
psychological techniques. For example, Henriques & Davidson (1991) have 
linked depression-related difficulties in sustained attention to hypoactivation in 
the prefrontal cortex via EEG recordings. Dynamic neuroimaging techniques 
offer great promise as well, as illustrated by evidence from positron emission 
tomography suggesting changes in blood flow to various brain areas during 
emotional and non-emotional states (Drevets & Raichle, in press). It is important 
to be aware that evidence concerning where in the brain such convergence occurs 
is correlational evidence, and therefore the usual warnings about causal inference 
apply (Sarter, Berntson & Cacioppo, 1996). 
GENERAL ISSUES AND CONCLUSION 
Control Conditions 
In designing experiments on cognition and emotion, the selection of appropriate 
control conditions is frequently necessary for two aspects of the experiment: first, 
if emotional state is an independent variable, there will usually need to be a 
control condition that establishes some sort of emotional baseline; and, second, if 
emotional stimulus materials are presented there will usually need to be materi­
als that serve a non-emotional control. The selection of either type of control is 
less clear-cut than is often appreciated. 
When emotional state serves as an independent variable, it is desirable to 
include a non-emotional control condition to clarify whether observed differ­
ences between emotional states are due to the effects of both states or only to 
those of one. For example, an experiment that compares the effects of elation 
to that of sadness will be unable to determine whether differences are due to 
changes caused by elation, by sadness or by both. If a non-emotional control 
condition is included, the two emotional conditions can be compared with it. The 
additional condition requires additional participants, and may have the effect 
of requiring smaller standard errors to detect a significant difference, but the 
benefits are often worth these costs. 
The question that arises is how to construct the control. What is the proper 
control: no emotion at all? A random sample of everyday emotions? A random 
sample of everyday emotions that have been "toned down" so that there are no 
intense emotions? These conceptions imply different techniques and procedures. 
Some researchers do indeed try to eliminate emotional states in any participants 
experiencing them at the onset of the experiment. The opposite approach is to do 
nothing at all to the participants in the control condition and have them com­
pletely bypass the mood induction portion of the procedure. An intermediate 
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approach is to provide control participants with an activity similar to that of the 
mood induction, but without the mood-altering qualities. 
The three approaches are best clarified with an example. A study that uses 
comedy and tragedy films to induce happy and sad moods might attempt the first 
control strategy by showing a film that has a calming effect; the second control 
strategy would entail showing no film at all; and the third strategy would entail 
showing a brief film on a non-emotional subject, but only for the purpose of 
providing a film-watching experience, not with any attempt at altering the partici­
pants' emotional states. In general, the second strategy of bypassing the induction 
will have the problem of confounding emotional state with unknown effects of 
participating in film-watching, and is therefore usually not the best choice if only 
one control condition is to be used but can be informative in conjunction with 
other control conditions. The first strategy of inducing a "neutral" mood is 
conceptually problematic because of a lack of agreement about whether such a 
state exists, but the procedures may nevertheless have the effect of reducing the 
average intensity and thereby decreasing variability within the control group. 
The third strategy accepts a diverse sample of emotional states as the proper 
control, but probably alters them somewhat by imposing the task of watching a 
film. Either of these latter two controls has something to recommend it. 
When an experiment exposes participants to emotional stimulus materials, 
another problem of control arises. Most frequently the problem arises when 
verbal materials are used, but pictures or photographs invite similar concerns 
(e.g. research on memory for central vs. peripheral details in emotional vs. non­
emotional slides; see Heuer & Reisberg, 1992). As an illustration, consider any 
finding of differential memory for materials that vary according to valence. Are 
emotional materials perceived or remembered better because they are emotional 
or because they differ in a number of characteristics from typically chosen neutral 
materials? The problem is obviously one of not being able to control, concomi­
tantly, all the non-emotional characteristics of the materials. If we select within 
certain ranges of word frequency, length, linguistic function and concreteness, for 
example, we might find that the neutral words are more unrelated to one another 
than are the emotional words. Some researchers have approached this problem 
by using categorized neutral words, such as musical instruments or household 
items (Dalgleish, 1995; Mogg et al., 1991), but perhaps there are process-specific 
differences between these kinds of categorical relations and relations among 
words that are organized primarily in terms of the emotions they denote or 
evoke. "Materials effects", therefore, are difficult to interpret, although they tend 
to be suspected primarily when they are revealed as main effects (e.g. Hertel & 
Milan, 1994). Moreover, they are suspected typically in experiments that use lists 
of words, instead of more ecologically valid scenes or descriptions, where they 
also might arise. Word-list experiments, however, typify mainstream cognitive 
paradigms, not because researchers lack imagination or concern with ecological 
validity, but because some measures of cognition require multi-trial formats and 
because characteristics of words have been normed. In short, problems arising 
from the use of emotionally valenced materials cannot be avoided merely by 
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eschewing word lists. When the emotionality of the event is central to the issue 
under investigation, the researcher should consider explicitly the possibility that 
other co-varying characteristics of the event contribute to the outcome. This 
prescription is equally applicable to the study of naturally occurring events. 
Ecological Validity 
The challenge of ecological validity, increasingly raised by cognitive researchers 
more generally (Herrmann et al., 1996), is particularly sharp when events are 
infused with emotion, due to the methodological and ethical difficulties inherent 
in simulating emotional meaning or arousal in the laboratory (see Yuille & 
Tollestrup, 1992). These difficulties have encouraged research paradigms that 
abandon traditional goals of experimental control. For example, assessments 
of autobiographical memories compounds the problems of lack of appropriate 
"materials" control with other potential confounds (e.g. practice in retrieval). 
When alternative explanations are thoroughly acknowledged or addressed, how­
ever, the study of autobiographical memory in emotional states or disorders 
reveals phenomena previously ignored or even obscured by traditional methods, 
such as the tendency of depressed people to produce overly general memories 
(Williams, 1992), or the phenomenon of mood-incongruent recall (Parrott & 
Sabini, 1990). As a result, several researchers have advocated the two-pronged 
approach of complementary laboratory and naturalistic studies (e.g. Kihlstrom, 
1996; Williams, 1992), and we concur. Few research programs to date actually 
incorporate both techniques, however. Although this research strategy has 
difficulty in addressing the issue of the causal status of the emotional valence 
of events, it does invite generality through diverse operational definitions of 
emotional value. 
Conclusion 
The issue of ecological validity in research on cognition and emotion is reminis­
cent of the debate about laboratory vs. "real-world" approaches to the study of 
memory (see Banaji & Crowder, 1989, and the replies following Loftus, 1991). 
The themes that emerged from that debate stress the advantages of multiple 
methods for investigations of memory. The value of conducting memory research 
in everyday settings is not only that it builds confidence in the external validity of 
laboratory findings, but also that it permits study of important phenomena that 
are difficult to produce or to address under more controlled conditions. Our 
survey of research methods suggests that the same point holds true for research 
on cognition and emotion. While adhering to the values of controlled experimen­
tation, we have emphasized the advantages to naturalistic investigation of cogni­
tion and emotion, and suggested that there is a natural complementarity between 
the two styles of research. 
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As the field of cognition and emotion matures, there is a more general need for 
a two-pronged approach combining laboratory and more naturalistic studies. 
This recommendation emerges from the difficulties associated with the use of any 
one method alone. For example, the causal status of emotional states can best 
be established by experimental inductions of mood, but to gain this advantage 
one must pay the price of concern about demand characteristics, contextual 
priming and generalizability to natural states. Those costs can often be reduced 
through recruiting participants who experience such states "naturally" or by 
studying emotions produced under natural conditions. But these states may be 
accompanied by other characteristics that affect performance. The obvious solu­
tion is to use both methods-to manipulate and to measure emotional differ­
ences-while taking pains to acknowledge the methodological challenges of each 
method and to base conclusions on the consistencies or inconsistencies in the 
patterns obtained. Such comparisons can be made across studies rather than 
within if other aspects of the methods are similar, but they should be made. 
With a few exceptions, however, this approach has been taken haphazardly or 
reconstructed in hindsight by writers of literature reviews. Greater systematic 
combination of multiple methods in laboratory and real-world settings would be 
a notable advance in the research methods in cognition and emotion. Such 
advances are necessary to continue the progress in understanding the causes and 
consequences of emotion from a cognitive perspective. 
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